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Abstract
In this thesis we quantify the risk arbitrage investment process and create trading
strategies that generate positive risk-adjusted returns. We use a sample of 895
stock swap mergers, cash mergers, and cash tender offers during 1998 - 2004Q2.
We test the market efficiency hypothesis, and after accounting for transaction costs,
we find that our risk arbitrage strategies generate annual risk-adjusted returns in
excess of 4.5%. The research also obtains various other merger statistics, and relates
them to a variety of economic indicators and merger timing models, as described in
past work. We also estimate conditional probabilities of a merger's success, using
a deal characteristic-driven prediction model, and combine it with market-implied
probabilities. Our analysis suggests that the probability of success of a merger
depends on a deal's characteristics. Further, it implies that one can improve on the
market-implied estimates thereby creating trading opportunities. The analytical
results achieved in this thesis can be used as the foundation for building an effective
risk arbitrage trading platform.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
"Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach
him how to arbitrage and you feed him forever."
- Warren Buffet [41
Arbitrage, in its classic form, involves the identification and capture of value
resulting from price differences between two or more identical or related assets.
However, risk arbitrage is an event-driven investment process which involves the
purchase and/or sale of securities affected by announced transactions, including
mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs, and corporate reorganizations. The arbitrageur in-
vests with the intent of profiting from changes in the value of the securities on the
consummation of the transaction.
Although a small community of professionals had practiced risk arbitrage in the
United States for several decades, the strategy was popularized during the corporate
takeover frenzy of the 1980s. Today, investment managers employ risk arbitrage
strategies at an extensive number of firms (see Figure 1-1), where they have realized
its potential to generate significant returns with low correlation to systemic stock
market risk. These characteristics have made risk arbitrage an attractive investment
management diversification tool.
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Figure 1-1: Risk arbitrage industry participants
1.1 Background and Previous Work
The risk arbitrage position essentially constitutes a "bet" on whether the proposed
transaction event of deal is consummated. The spread between the market values
of consideration received in the deal (i.e., acquirer's stock, cash, etc.) relative to
the market values of securities to be given up (i.e., target's stock) reflects the bet's
payoff. Between the time of announcement and that of its closure, two factors
primarily dictate the magnitude of the spread: the time value of money and the risk
premium.
Risk arbitrage invokes images of extraordinary profits and implosions. Numerous
articles in the popular press detail large profits generated by famous arbitrageurs
such as Ivan Boesky [2] and even larger losses by hedge funds such as Long Term
Capital Management [11]. The existing academic studies demonstrate that risk
arbitrage strategies generate substantial excess returns. For example, Mitchell and
Pulvino [8], using a sample of 4,750 merger offers from 1963 - 1998, find that risk
arbitrage creates excess returns of 4% per year. Jindra and Walking [7] and Dukes
et. al. [6] focus on cash tender offers between 1971 - 1985 and document annual
14
excess returns far exceeding 100%. In a study using a diversified portfolio of risk
arbitrage positions in the U.S. cash and stock mergers between 1981 - 1996, Baker
and Sava§oglu [1] conclude that risk arbitrage generates excess returns of 12.5%.
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec YTD
1997 3.02 1.28 -0.01 0.33 3.46 2.59 3.1 0.33 4.09 0.93 1.63 1.54 24.6%
1998 0.7 4 3.21 1.31 -1.32 -0.6 -0.22 -9.94 -0.59 1.47 3.37 2.3 3.0%
1999 2.66 -0.35 3.4 6.17 2.13 3.06 1.45 -0.33 0.25 -0.32 2.86 3.65 27.3%
2000 1.49 4.11 1.36 -0.45 -0.63 2.15 1.11 2.35 -0.03 -0.3 -1.27 1.7 12.1%
2001 2.96 0.29 -0.7 0.93 1.91 0.93 0.25 0.21 -2.65 1.36 1.06 1.6 8.4%
2002 0.65 -0.88 1.61 0.59 0.21 -3.55 -3.32 0.27 -1.55 0.45 2.56 0.26 -2.8%
2003 1.21 0.07 0.76 3.1 3.67 1.78 1.01 1.52 1.23 2.22 1.36 2.21 22.0%
2004 2.69 1.63 0.43 -0.35 -0.7 1.28 3.9%
Figure 1-2: Monthly/Annual returns for event-driven hedge funds, Source: Barclays
Risk-Arb Index
The practitioner community has long included dedicated risk arbitrage part-
nerships and individual arbitrageurs. Today, several hedge funds operate focused
event-driven groups and opportunistically pursue risk arbitrage strategies, thereby
generating substantial returns for their investors, see Figure 1-2.
We also revisit the issue of merger timing models with respect to economic factors
and capital market conditions [14, 16]. In particular, we explore the relationship
between merger activity and valuation levels in the capital markets, Figure 1-3 and
find several characteristics of the data speaking to the questions of when mergers
occur and how they are funded.
1.2 Mergers and Acquisitions
A merger or acquisition represents a defining moment for the acquiring company.
No other single corporate action has such a marked effect on the future performance
of an acquiring company. Motivations for conducting mergers and acquisitions vary,
15
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Figure 1-3: Announced merger deals since 1998 and S&P 500 level
but many focus both on realizing potential cost synergies and other benefits from
economies of scale as well as fueling growth by acquiring a company with an attrac-
tively valued set of services and/or products. Strategic considerations for conducting
a merger or an acquisition often include a geographic extension of current prod-
ucts and/or services. The desire to combine complementary products or services
which enhances the acquirer's overall business mix may also be included. However,
conducting a merger or acquisition creates unique execution risks for the acquiring
company, and as history proves, integration difficulties can erode the potential value
of a transaction.
The announcement of a merger or acquisition conventionally accompanies in-
vestor inquiry regarding the general strategic merits of the combination. If skepti-
cism follows the transaction, shareholders tend to first sell and then later determine
the value of the combination. General shareholder skepticism stems from the myriad
of execution risks that accompany any proposed merger or acquisition. Typically,
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closing conditions become numerous and may include U.S. and foreign regulatory ap-
proval, shareholder approval, state and local approvals, as well as the satisfaction of
disclosure conditions contained within the merger agreement. At times, shareholders
believe the efforts required to satisfy these closing conditions distract management
from focusing on the day-to-day operations of the acquiring company. These doubts
create opportunities for arbitrageurs to take on calculated "bets" based on such
deals.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis we quantify the risk arbitrage investment process and create trading
strategies that generate positive risk-adjusted returns. We use a sample of 895 stock
swap mergers, cash mergers, and cash tender offers during 1998 - 2004Q2, see Figure
1-4.
Initial shareholder reaction is critical to any successful merger deal, as a de-
clining acquirer share price may spark opposition to the transaction and attract
hostile bidders towards the target company. To analyze this reaction, we conduct
an event study to scrutinize and determine which market and merger-related at-
tributes lead to an adverse initial reaction in the acquirers share price in the event
of the announcement of a merger or acquisition.
Deal Status # of Deals % Aggregate Value($mil)
Completed 792 88.5 $3,560,541
Terminated/Withdrawn 103 11.5 $811,028
Total 895 100 $4,371,569
Figure 1-4: 1998-2004 merger data set used for analysis, Source: Bloomberg
17
We then perform a probit analysis on the data to obtain a merger prediction
model and implement the Mitchell and Pulvino [8] risk arbitrage portfolio policies
on this data. We test the market efficiency hypothesis, and after accounting for
transaction costs, we find that our risk arbitrage strategies generate annual risk-
adjusted returns in excess of 4.5% with variations across deals. We also estimate
conditional probabilities of a merger's success, using our prediction model, and com-
bine with market-implied probabilities. Our analysis suggest that the probability of
success of a merger depends on a deal's characteristics. Further, it implies that one
can improve on the market-implied estimates thereby creating trading opportunities.
We also quantify the risk and return process within risk arbitrage strategies in
a novel and effective manner. The analytical results achieved in this thesis can
be used as the foundation for constructing an effective risk arbitrage investment
management process.
18
Chapter 2
Acquirer Share Price Reaction
We conduct an analysis of acquirers' share price reactions to announced transactions.
We compile data on all mergers and acquisitions involving public targets and public
acquirers from January 1, 1998 through June 30, 2004. In order to best interpret the
share price reaction of acquirers, we first provide a brief statistical review of the 895
announced mergers and acquisitions during the past five years. We then use these
results as a motivation to build models for aiding in the risk arbitrage investment
process.
In aggregate, 895 transactions over $400 million in value involving public U.S. or
Canadian targets were announced. The aggregate value of these announced trans-
actions is roughly $4.4 trillion1 . Of these 895 transactions, 103 prevail as either
withdrawn or terminated (88.5% completion rate), as shown in 1-4.
'For some perspective, the aggregate market cap of all the companies in the S&P 500 at the
end of 2003 was about $10.3 trillion.
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2.1 Price Reaction
An acquirer's share price trades down 3% on the day of an announced merger or
acquisition, as shown in Figure 2-1. This result matches our intuition, as investors
generally react cautiously to the announcement of a merger or acquisition and may
decide to sell the acquirer's stock due to a perceived elevation in execution risks.
From a technical standpoint, this result is not surprising, as typically risk arbi-
trageurs initially short sell the acquirer and buy the target company to set up a
hedged arbitrage position.
However, based on our data set, acquirer share prices generally do not rebound
in the days following the announcement of a merger of acquisition. On average, we
ascertain that acquirer share prices are still down 3.2% in the subsequent 15 trad-
ing days after announcement. Contributing to this result is the continued pressure
arbitrageurs place on acquirer shares as they build positions in the deal. Interest-
ingly, this short pressure is not mitigated by fundamental buying, as it appears that
investor apprehension toward the announcement is not temporary.
Total # of Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % onYears deals ann dt day+1 day+2 day+3 day+4 day+5 day+10 day+1 5
1998 -- 2004 Q2 895 -3.0% -3.2% -3.1% -3.2% -3.1% -3.1% -3.1% -3.2%
Figure 2-1: Acquirer share price reaction post merger/acquistion announcement
2.1.1 Yearly
To determine the yearly variability of acquirer share price reactions, we break our
data set by calendar year, as shown in Figure 2-2. The range of acquirer returns (ex-
cluding S&P 500 performance) on announcement date is negative 1.5% to negative
5%, which suggests a significant calendar year difference: Importantly, no yearly
20
average proves positive. The two years of largest negative initial reactions are 2000
and 2002, when acquirer share prices trade down 5.0% and 3.9%, respectively. The
two years of the least negative initial reactions are 1998 and 1999, when acquirer
share prices trade down 1.5% and 2.5%, respectively. These acquirer share price
reactions appear generally tied to overall market conditions and investor sentiment.
In 2000 and 2002, the S&P 500 posted negative returns, and in 1998 and 1999, the
S&P 500 posted positive returns.
Total # of Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % onYears deals ann dt day+1 day+2 day+3 day+4 day+5 day+ 10 day+15
1998 187 -1.5% -2.1% -2.2% -2.1% -2.4% -2.4% -3.0% -3.6%
1999 229 -2.5% -2.5% -2.5% -2.9% -2.8% -2.7% -2.6% -2.7%
2000 191 -5.0% -5.6% -5.7% -5.7% -5.5% -5.2% -4.8% -5.0%
2001 112 -0.3% -2.2% -1.8% -1.8% -1.8% -1.7% -1.8% -1.2%
2002 43 -3.9% -2.9% -2.7% -2.5% -1.9% -2.7% -2.7% -2.5%
2003 74 -3.1% -3.4% -3.2% -3.4% -3.1% -2.6% -2.9% -2.6%
2004 YTD 59 -2.5% -2.9% -2.9% -3.3% -3.1% -3.2% -3.5% -2.9%
Figure 2-2: Acquirer share price reaction post merger/acquistion announcement com-
puted annually
2.1.2 Quarterly
As expected, the variability of average acquirer share price reactions increases when
analyzing quarterly data. Figure 2-3 highlights the quarterly breakdown of average
acquirer share price reactions from 1Q98 through 2Q04. In the 26 quarters we
analyzed, 25 induce negative average acquirer share price reactions on the day of
the announcement of a merger or acquisition. Overall variance remains high as
quarterly acquirer share price performance ranges from negative 6.9% (1Q03) to
positive 0.3% (3Q98).
The quarterly S&P 500 performance partially explains the high variance of quar-
terly average acquirer share price reactions. Generally speaking, negative quarterly
21
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ter
2-3: Acquirer share price reaction post merger/acquistion announcement, by quar-
returns loosely associated with lower-than-average 2 acquirer share price reactions.
The four quarters of poorest average acquirer share price reactions (00Q2, 00Q4,
02Q3, and 03Q1) each feature negative quarterly S&P 500 returns. Significantly,
these four quarters also associate with high absolute levels of the CBOE SPX Volatil-
ity Index (VIX), see Figure 2-4. This suggests that during times of high market-
implied volatility, indicating high perceived market risk levels, investors are more
acutely aware of merger-related execution risks. However, the converse does not gen-
erally occur. Periods of historically low levels of the VIX do not generally associate
with above-average acquirer share price reactions.
2 A negative reaction implies a drop in price for a stock.
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Figure 2-4: The Chicago Board of Exchange S&P 500 Volatility Index, 1998-2004Q2
The overall performance of the market can influence average acquirer share price
reactions. The four quarters that feature the highest S&P 500 returns (98Q1, 98Q4,
99Q4, and 03Q2) all exhibit better-than-average acquirer share price reactions. From
our analysis, we conclude that high levels of the VIX and negative S&P 500 returns
are associated with below-average acquirer share price reactions and that high S&P
500 quarterly returns are associated with above-average acquirer share price reac-
tions.
2.1.3 Consideration Type
To test whether the consideration offered by the acquirer affects share price reac-
tion, we divide our data set into four categories: all stock, all cash, cash and stock,
and cash or stock mergers and acquisitions, see Figure 2-5. The results were sur-
prising, especially 15 trading days after the announcement of the transaction. The
announcement of an all-cash acquisition, on average, had no impact on the share
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price of the acquirer. Initially, the acquirer share price traded down half a percent,
but after 15 trading days, it trades back to preannouncement levels.
Type of Total # of Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on
Transaction deals ann dt day+1 day+2 day+3 day+4 day+5 day+10 day+15
Cash 229 -0.5% -0.3% -0.3% -0.6% -0.7% -0.5% -0.2% 0.0%
Cash & Stock 129 -3.0% -2.0% -2.1% -2.2% -2.0% -1.8% -2.4% -2.2%
Cash or Stock 48 -3.2% -3.7% -3.2% -2.7% -2.2% -1.7% -1.9% -2.2%
Stock 489 -4.0% -4.7% -4.7% -4.6% -4.5% -4.6% -4.8% -5.0%
Figure 2-5: Acquirer share price reaction post merger/acquistion announcement by con-
sideration type
The announcement of an all-stock merger or acquisition experiences a signif-
icantly deteriorating reception, and the acquirer's share price on average trades
down 4% on the day of the announcement. Furthermore, its performance does not
improve even after 15 trading days, thereby trading down 5% on average. The di-
vergence in performance may be attributed to a number of factors. All-cash deals
generally are smaller than all-stock deals, and investors can react more adversely
to larger mergers and acquisitions that carry greater execution risks and potential
financial impact. All-cash acquisitions do not require risk arbitrageurs to short sell
the shares of the acquirer, and the lack of selling pressure can also help perfor-
mance. Mergers and acquisitions that combine cash and stock lie between all-cash
and all-stock transactions as acquirer share prices trade down about 3% on the day
of announcement.
2.1.4 Premium Range
The average announced premium across our entire data set is 25%. Anecdotally, we
observe that the larger the premium, the greater the negative acquirer share price
reaction. To test this observation, we examine the relationship between acquirer
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share price reaction and premium paid for the target company. We divide our data
set into quintiles representing premium ranges, as shown in Figure 2-6. Acquirer
share price performance habitually appears inversely related to the premium paid,
and the under-performance of high-premium-paying acquirers persists from the day
of deal announcement through the 15-day post-announcement trading period.
Premium Total # of Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on
deals ann dt day+1 day+2 day+3 day+4 day+5 day+10 day+15
Less than 20% 431 -1.5% -1.4% -1.5% -1.6% -1.5% -1.6% -1.5% -1.9%
20% to 39% 281 -3.9% -4.3% -4.1% -4.2% -4.2% -4.0% -4.3% -4.1%
40% tO 59% 118 -4.7% -4.9% -4.8% -5.0% -4.6% -4.3% -4.4% -3.7%
60% to 79% 36 -4.9% -5.1% -4.5% -4.3% -4.1% -4.5% -4.6% -5.6%
80% and Up 29 -5.4% -8.3% -8.4% -8.3% -8.7% -9.3% -9.1% -8.8%
Figure 2-6: Acquirer share price reaction post merger/acquistion announcement, by pre-
mium range
The results of our analysis match our general intuition, as high-premium deals
predominantly attract higher levels of investor scrutiny for various reasons. High-
premium mergers and acquisitions generally are associated with strategic rationales
focused on future growth potential and are usually dilutive in the near term. Re-
alizing the future growth potential of a dilutive transaction can be perceived as
having a high degree of execution risks. However, moderate-premium deals that
seek to realize operational synergies and are immediately accretive principally are
viewed as having lower execution risks. Speaking to this conclusion, mergers and
acquisitions with premiums below 20% exhibit an average acquirer price reaction of
only negative 1.5%. Transactions that feature a premium of 40% or more, exhibit
an above-average acquirer price reaction of negative 5%.
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2.1.5 Relative Acquirer Size
We observe that investors perceive a greater degree of execution risk in mergers and
acquisitions in which the deal size represents a large portion of the acquirer's market
cap. To test this, we segregate our data set of acquirer share price reaction into
quintiles of deal equity value divided by acquirer market capitalization, see Figure
2-7. Reflecting our intuition, the larger size of the merger or acquisition vis-h-vis the
size of the acquirer, corresponds to a more negative acquirer share price reaction.
Mergers and acquisitions that are of larger relative size pre-eminently have greater
financial impact on the acquirer and carry greater execution risks. Transactions that
represent a low value relative to the size of the acquirer (less than 20%) correspond
to a negative 1.6% average return on the day of announcement. Importantly, this
initial reaction is effaced in the 15 trading days following the announcement.
Deal Equity Value/ Total # of Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on
Acg Mkt Cap deals ann dt day+1 day+2 day+3 day+4 day+5 day+10 day+1 5
Less than 20% 391 -1.6% -1.2% -0.8% -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% -0.5% -0.2%
20% to 39% 139 -3.2% -4.3% -4.6% -4.6% -3.8% -3.8% -4.20/ -4.5%
40% tO 59% 89 -3.7% -4.4% -4.4% -4.5% -4.6% -4.9% -5.6% -6.6%
60% to 79% 68 -4.4% -4.5% -5.2% -4.6% -5.0% -4.7% -4.9% -5.4%
80% and Up 195 -4.7% -5.2% -5.6% -5.8% -5.6% -5.5% -6.0% -6.0%
Figure 2-7: Acquirer share price reaction post merger/acquistion announcement, by rel-
ative acquirer size
Conversely, in transactions that represent a substantial portion of the acquirer's
size (80% and more), average acquirer share prices trade down 4.7% on the day of
announcement and continue to depreciate to negative 6.0% in the 15 trading days
after announcement. Overall, the relationship remains fairly uniform, and as the
quintile augments, the acquirer share price reaction exacerbates.
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2.1.6 Deal Consummation Time
We observe that deals featuring longer estimated times to completion correlate to
greater risks. Frequently, transaction time lines are dictated by the expected dura-
tion of the regulatory review process, and a lengthy review by regulators generally
indicates an increased likelihood of an in-depth investigation and possible structural
remedies which are required to receive necessary approvals. To test whether a rela-
tionship exists between time and initial acquirer share price reaction, we divide our
data set into three-month increments of time to completion, as shown in Figure 2-8.
Total # of Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % on Acq % onTime to Completion deals ann dt day+1 day+2 day+3 day+4 day+5 day+10 day+15
Less than 3 Months 313 -3.1% -3.3% -3.3% -3.5% -3.3% -3.1% -3.0% -3.3%
3-6 Months 358 -3.1% -3.4% -3.3% -3.2% -3.1% -3.1% -3.0% -3.1%
6-9 Months 149 -2.1% -2.4% -2.3% -2.4% -2.6% -2.9% -3.4% -3.5%
9-12 Months 41 -2.5% -2.9% -2.5% -2.7% -2.7% -2.6% -4.1% -1.7%
1 Year and Up 34 -4.3% -3.9% -4.2% -4.2% -3.6% -3.8% -3.7% -4.5%
Figure 2-8: Acquirer share price reaction post merger/acquistion announcement, by time
to completion
The results of our analysis remain generally inconclusive. As the time to comple-
tion advances, we would expect the negative average acquirer share price reaction
to increase. However, transactions that took less than three months to complete
and those that took three to six months to complete exhibit average acquirer share
price reactions. Surprisingly, transactions that take six to nine months to consum-
mate and nine to twelve months to complete exhibit above-average acquirer share
price reactions. Transactions that take one year or more to complete match our
pre-supposition, as they exhibit worse-than-average acquirer share price reactions.
Based on these weak results, we cannot conclude that a longer time to completion
leads to below-average acquirer share price reaction.
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2.2 Merger Analysis Summary
Based on our analysis of 895 mergers and acquisitions exceeding $400 million in
value that were announced from January 1, 1998 through June 30, 2004, we arrive
at the following conclusions:
" On average, acquirers trade down 3% on the day of an announcement of a
merger or acquisition. Regardless of whether or not the dataset is divided by
quarter, year, consideration, or relative size, the average acquirer share price
reaction remains negative on the day of announcement.
" From our analysis of the quarterly average acquirer share price reactions, we
generally conclude that high levels of the CBOE SPX Volatility Index (VIX)
and negative S&P 500 returns are associated with below-average acquirer share
price reactions while high S&P 500 quarterly returns are associated with above-
average acquirer share price reactions.
" The announcement of an all-stock merger or acquisition experienced a mate-
rially worse reception, with the acquirer share price, on average, trading down
4% on the day of the announcement, and its performance does not improve
even after 15 trading days and on average down 5%. As expected, the an-
nouncement of an all-cash acquisition, on average, had no impact on the share
price of the acquirer.
" Mergers and acquisitions with premiums below 20% exhibit an average ac-
quirer price reaction of only negative 1.5% on the day of announcement.
Transactions that feature a premium of 40% or more exhibit an above-average
acquirer price reaction of negative 5%.
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* The larger relative size of the merger or acquisition vis-a-vis the size of the
acquirer corresponds to a more negative acquirer share price reaction.
Our findings in this chapter are consistent with those described from a macroe-
conomic perspective by Shleifer and Vishny [14] and Verter [16], with respect to
merger timing models.
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Chapter 3
Risk Arbitrage Investment Process
Risk arbitrage is an exciting and challenging process. Stocks involved in such trans-
actions may become volatile, and if the deal works out, the arbitrageur involved in
the transaction may realize a large gain. On the other hand, if the transaction is
terminated, the share price may drop precipitously, thereby leading to large losses
for the arbitrageur.
In order to minimize the variance in investment returns and to maximize the suc-
cess of a transaction, the arbitrageur tries to determine the probability of a deal's
occurrence. The flow chart in Figure 3-1 shows the process that the arbitrageur
uses in analyzing information and estimating returns and risks for a particular in-
vestment. This chapter focuses on the boxed part shown in Figure 3-1, and we
effectively quantify and characterize the risk and return for risk arbitrage invest-
ments. We also discuss certain qualitative factors which emerge as essential to the
quantification process and the success of investments in risk arbitrage. The results
of this chapter can be used as the foundations for an electronic trading platform for
these types of investments.
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Figure 3-1: Analyzing and estimating returns for a risk arbitrage investment
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3.1 Typical Investments
Two primary types of mergers embody typical investments: cash mergers and stock
mergers. In a cash merger, the acquiring company offers to exchange cash for the
target company's equity or assets. In a stock merger, the acquirer offers its common
stock to the target's shareholders in lieu of cash. The arbitrageur's investment
depends on the form of payment to the target shareholders. In a cash merger, the
arbitrageur simply buys the target company's stock. Because the target's stock
typically sells at a discount to the payment promised by the acquirer, profits can
be made by buying the target's stock and holding it until merger consummation.
At that time, the arbitrageur sells the target's common stock to the acquiring firm
for the offer price. There are two sources for the return from this investment. The
primary source of profit is the difference between the purchase price of the targets
stock and the ultimate offer price. The secondary source of profit is the dividend
paid by the target company.
In a stock merger, the arbitrageur sells short the acquiring firm's stock in ad-
dition to buying the target's stock. In such cases, there are three sources of the
arbitrageur's profit. Like cash deals, the primary source of profit is the difference
between the price obtained from the short sale of the acquirer's stock and the price
paid for the target's stock. The second source of profit is the dividend paid on the
investment in the target's stock. However, this is offset by dividends that must be
paid on the acquirer's stock, as it was borrowed and sold short. The third source of
profits in a stock deal comes from interest paid by the arbitrageur's broker on the
proceeds from the short sale of the acquirer's stock. For individual investors, the
interest rate typically equals zero. However, for institutions and hedge funds, short
proceeds earn interest at a rate close to the risk-free rate.
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3.2 Risk
The risk estimation process begins with the initial announcement of the merger.
The key for the arbitrageur, is to calculate the worst-case absolute dollar loss ex-
posure he may have in entering the deal. In addition to the total dollar risk, the
arbitrageur would also want to calculate the market-implied probability and various
other qualitative risks that the deal may involve.
The initial step in analyzing a deal's risk involves the examination of the trading
history of the target company's securities. The arbitrageur wants to ensure that
there is no evidence of an information leak that generated insider-trading prior to the
merger announcement. In verification: if the target company's stock significantly
progresses upward in the days prior to the announcement, and no fundamental
explanation or reason can be sought to explain this activity, the total risk that we
quantify will not be a good guide for determining the actual risk exposure. In this
type of a situation, the arbitrageur should use the price level that the stock traded
at before any significant move.
3.2.1 Total Dollar Risk
The dollar risk can be broken down in to two parts: 1) that of the target's stock
and 2) that of the acquirer's stock. We characterize TOTAL RISK as:
TOTAL RISK = RD + Ru .
RD is defined as the downside risk which stems from the long position in the
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target's stock:
RD -ST ~DT
= -0.01ST,
where, ST is the stock price of the target on the date of the announcement and DT
is the historical' estimate of the target stock (for the long position in the portfolio)
if the deal is terminated and is equal to 1.01ST.
Ru is defined as the upside risk which derives from the short position in the
acquirer's stock:
Ru = (UA - SA) (N)
=0.02SA (N)
where, SA is the the stock price of the acquirer on the date of the announcement,
UA is the historical' estimate of the acquirer's stock (for the short position in the
portfolio) if the deal is terminated and is equal to 1.02SA, NA is the number of
acquirer shares sold short, and NT is the number of target shares owned.
Hence, total risk can be defined as:
TOTAL RISK = - 0 .01ST 0.02SA (N)
We can consider TOTAL RISK (per share of target's stock) to be our estimate of the
absolute dollar loss (L) one could experience if an announced deal went sour.
3.2.2 Market-Implied Probability
The absolute dollar loss estimate L is a key for correctly identifying individual ar-
bitrage risks and in estimating the market-implied probability. Allocating a precise
'The historical estimates, for the target and acquirer share price, after a deal is terminated are
calculated by averaging through all historical deals in our data set, Figure 1-4.
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probability estimate for a deal's outcome proves to be a difficult task. Most arbi-
trageurs rely on their experience instead of quantifying the probabilities to obtain
estimates for expected return.
The arbitrageur uses his estimates of return and risk, along with the market
value of securities to obtain the expected loss L and expected profit, which equals
the net spread between the merger terms and that of the current stock prices, P.
The optimal way then to identify the outcome probability is to work backward from
the market inputs and to obtain the probability that would make the expected rate
of return E(R) equal to zero. Given the horizon and the risk characteristics of such
deals, zero expected return appears to be a good approximation. In actuality, the
expected return is normally positive due to the embedded time-value of money in a
risk arbitrage strategy.
Thus, the market-implied probability lrm is calculated as:
(7rm x P) + ((1 - rm) x L) = 0
L (3.1)
S07 7M P 
-L
3.2.3 Other Risks and Measures
A critical part of the work performed by the arbitrageur is continuously monitoring
the deal, see Figures 3-3 and 3-2, as it progresses through the approval process and
assessing at each stage the probability of the deal's actual completion at the antic-
ipated spreads, see Figures 3-4 and 3-5. In short, an arbitrageur must perpetually
quantify the risk initially taken on in the arbitrage.
Unfortunately, a lot of other risks surrounding a merger transaction are not con-
cretely quantifiable and are very qualitative in nature. The arbitrageur's experience
then stands as an important asset and becomes very useful. However, as we show
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risks
in the portfolio construction part of this chapter, Section 3.4, an understanding of
these factors is certainly not a prerequisite to good returns, but we feel that limiting
one s investments through an understanding of these factors would further enhance
the reported returns.
Some common deal risks include the following:
Shareholder dissent Shareholders who disagree with the merger plans could pur-
sue various legal measures to block the deal. The amount of institutional
holding in the company then becomes a part of the investment decision pro-
cess as well.
Tax Approval IRS approval for attempted tax-free reorganizations is not guaran-
teed. An adverse ruling by the IRS could dramatically change the economics
of the contemplated transaction and force it to be called off.
Antitrust Issues The antitrust analysis process is usually a difficult phenomenon
to predict. The most common procedure remains to identify similar transac-
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tions and compare and contrast their characteristics.
Management Management teams leading the target and acquirer corporations
may find themselves clashing throughout the process and thus may threaten
the successful completion of the deal. The only way of pacifying oneself to
this risk, is talking to the management and understanding their philosophy
and motive behind the transaction.
3.3 Returns and Portfolios
The analysis reported in this section are based on monthly risk-arbitrage returns
and closely follow the analysis reported by Mitchell and Pulvino [8] for comparison
of results. Monthly returns are obtained by compounding daily returns using two
approaches, each of which is described below. In both approaches, we begin by
calculating daily returns at the close of the market on the day after the merger
announcement. Daily returns are calculated for every transaction-day up to and
including the "resolution day." For successful deals, the resolution day is defined
by the day on which the target's stock is delisted from the index. For failed deals,
the resolution day is the day after deal failure is publicly announced. Using the day
after the announcement as the beginning date ensures that arbitrage returns are not
inadvertently biased upward by the takeover premium. Similarly, using the day after
deal failure is announced as the resolution date for failed transactions insures that
the arbitrage returns are not biased upward by inadvertently exiting failed deals
before the failure is announced.
Transactions in which the terms of the deal are revised before deal consummation
are treated as multiple transactions. An investment in the transaction under the
original terms is made at the close of market on the day following the announcement.
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This position is closed at the close of market on the day following the announce-
ment of the bid revision. At the same time, an investment is made in the revised
transaction and is held until the transaction resolution date. Transactions in which
there are multiple bidders are handled in a similar manner. That is, one target can
generate multiple transactions. Positions in a given transaction are held until the
bidder announces that it is terminating its pursuit of the target, or when the target
is delisted from the index, whichever occurs earlier.
We now describe the different portfolios that we will simulate, and we then
evaluate and compare them.
3.3.1 Value-Weighted Returns (VWRA)
For every active transaction-month in the sample period, monthly returns are cal-
culated by compounding daily returns. An active transaction-month is defined for
every transaction to be any month that contains a trading day between the transac-
tion's beginning date and its resolution date. If a transaction is active for only part
of a month, the partial-month return is used. This effectively assumes that capital
is invested in a zero-return account for that portion of the month that the transac-
tion is not active. Portfolio monthly returns are obtained by calculating a weighted
average of transaction-month returns for each month, where the total market eq-
uity value of the target company is used as the weighting factor. This approach
mitigates the bias that is induced by calculating monthly returns by compounding
equal-weighted daily returns [5]. The equation below specifies the monthly return
calculation procedure:
v F M(1 + Rit) - I
Rmonth~j Lt- E -_1 (3.2)
i=1 zf=
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where j indexes months between 1998 and 2004Q2, i indexes active deals in a month
(there are Nj active deals in month j), t indexes trading days in a transaction month,
Rj is the monthly return, Rt is the return on deal i on day t, and Vi is the market
value of deal i's equity. Because the targets market equity is used as the weighting
factor, a greater proportion of the portfolio is invested in larger, and presumably
more liquid targets. However, this approach in no way controls illiquidity in the
acquirer's stock. Thus, returns calculated using the weighted averaging procedure
may be deemed unrealistic in that they assume that there is an ample supply of
the acquirer's stock available to be shorted. Of course, this is only a problem with
stock-for-stock mergers where the acquirer's stock is difficult to borrow. In cash
tenders and mergers, the typical risk arbitrage investment does not involve trading
in the acquiring firm's equity, and therefore, the liquidity of the acquirer's stock is
considered inconsequential.
There are two other features of the VWRA approach that are worth noting.
First, this method effectively assumes that the arbitrage portfolio is invested in every
transaction. Because of the fixed costs associated with investing in a transaction,
this is a feature that large risk arbitrage hedge funds are unable to implement.
Second, it assumes that there are no transactions costs associated with investing in
a transaction. Both of these assumptions are clearly unrealistic. However, the time
series of returns generated from this approach provide a benchmark that is useful
for comparing results from this study to those documented in other papers.
VWRA Portfolio
This portfolio is constructed using the VWRA series described in Section 3.3.1 and
we invest money in all merger transactions that take place between 1998 and 2004Q2.
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The portfolio generates a compound annual return2 of 5.48% with a standard devi-
ation of 14.47%, without any transaction costs. The portfolio generates an annual
3
a of 81 basis points
3.3.2 Risk Arbitrage Index Manager (RAIM)
The risk arbitrage index manager [8], attempts to compensate for the unrealistic
assumptions embedded in the VWRA method by simulating a risk arbitrage port-
folio. Note that in this portfolio, the hypothetical arbitrageur does not attempt
to discriminate between anticipated successful and unsuccessful deals. To generate
this time series of returns, the portfolio is seeded with $1 million of capital at the
beginning of 1998. As mergers are announced, the $1 million is invested subject
to two constraints. The first constraint is that no investment can represent more
than 10% of the total portfolio's value at the time the investment is made. This is a
standard rule of thumb followed by most risk arbitrage hedge funds and is intended
to insulate the fund from a catastrophic loss caused by failure of a single deal. The
second constraint limits the fund's investments in illiquid securities. It does this by
restricting the amount invested in any single deal so that the price impact on both
the target and acquirer's stock is less than 5%. To implement this constraint, the
following price impact model developed by Breen et. al. [3] Equation 1) is used:
AP
= I(NTO) (3.3)
P
where price impact, 7, is set equal to 5% and / is the illiquidity coefficient and
equals to the predicted value from the Breen et. al. model [3] (detailed description
2The use of emphreturns in this thesis, implies raw returns.
3 is as determined by the CAPM, and is described as the absolute return on a particular
investment that is uncorrelated with the market, see Section 3.5 for details.
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is provided in A). To determine the size of an investment, the most restrictive stock
(e.g. target or acquirer) is used as long as the resulting position is less than 10%
of the simulated funds total capital. If both the target's stock and the acquirer's
stock are extremely liquid, the 10% diversification constraint binds our investment.
In this case, as long as the simulated fund has sufficient cash, it invests 10% of total
capital in the deal.
RAIM Portfolio
This portfolio is constructed using the VWRA series described in Section 3.3.2
and we invest money in all merger transactions that take place between 1998 and
2004Q2. The portfolio generates an average annual return of 1.42% with a standard
deviation of 5.39%, with transaction costs of $0.04 per share traded. The portfolio
also generates an annual o of 57 basis points.
3.3.3 Probit Model
A probit model is an econometric model and is defined as:
P(y = 1|x) = <(x)
where (D is the standard cumulative normal probability distribution, x is a vector of
independent variables, and 3 is a row vector of coefficients. Ox is called the probit
index.
Motivation
We make an attempt to quantify the probability of a successful merger transaction
for a particular deal. We believe that the success of such transactions depends on
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the characteristics of a deal and the companies involved in the deal, and test the
awareness of the market about such information by creating a probit model.
We use the quantitative and qualitative analysis of different metrics from Chapter
2 and isolate certain key statistics that emerge as imperatively linked to the success
of a merger deal. We then use these measures as the conditional variables for our
merger prediction model and develop a trading strategy based on this model.
Data Description
Unlike many previous studies that focus on specific types of transactions such as cash
tenders, we study arbitrage returns to cash tenders, cash mergers, and stock swap
mergers. There are two advantages to including multiple types of mergers in the
sample. First, it allows us to simulate a realistic investment strategy more similar to
strategies pursued by risk arbitrage hedge funds. In order to keep investors' money
employed, these hedge funds typically invest in a broad range of merger situations,
not just cash deals. Second, it provides a sample that is large enough to study
the time series characteristics of risk arbitrage returns, especially returns realized
during severe market downturns. This stays necessary to accurately measure the
systematic risk inherent in risk arbitrage. The data set for this study includes all
publicly traded firms that were listed during 1998 - 2004Q2 and were involved in a
merger or acquisition, see Figure 1-4.
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Variable Estimate Standard Error
Ce -0.4386** 0.1457
'1 0.2437* 0.0902
12 0.1760** 0.0302
33 -0.0812** 0.0179
04 0.1932** 0.0789
35 0.0613* 0.0318
Significance levels: * = 0.05, ** = 0.01
Table 3.1: Our Probit Model. Standard errors are calculated assuming independence
across years. Assumptions are made regarding the independence of transactions that
terminate in the same year.
Our Model
We developed the following probit model:
/ Size
P(Fail = 1) a + O 1Cash + 0 2RelSize + /3 ln + 4TenderS&P500
+ /5NoMergers)
(3.4)
where Fail is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the deal fails and zero
otherwise; Cash is a dummy variable if the acquirer offered to pay 100% cash for
the target; RelSize is the fraction of the target's market cap to that of acquirer's
market cap; ln s is the log of the target's market value to that of the annual
average of the S&P 500 index; Tender is a dummy variable equal to one if the offer
was a cash tender; NoMergers is equal to the number of mergers that took place in
the past six month window. The results of the model are depicted in Table 3.1.
The average success probability for our probit model is 0.57 and the model has
a variation of 0.058.
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Probit Probability v/s Market-Implied Probability
One way to visualize the fact that deal characteristics matter, is to construct a
scatter plot for the market-implied probability (7rm) and probit model probability
(7r,,) on a deal-by-deal basis, as shown in Figure 3-6. We can see that the implied
probabilities and our model probabilities match most of the time. We also compute
a metric B,
N2
(7,m - rrn) (3.5)
n=1
which we refer to as market-error. The market-error is equal to 0.0410. This confirms
that our estimates of conditional probabilities of a merger's success combined with
market-implied probabilities suggest that the probability of success depends on a
deal's characteristics and that one can improve on the market estimates, thereby
creating trading opportunities.
PM Portfolio
This portfolio is constructed using the probit model and has RAIM constraints. In
particular, we invest in all deals that have a greater probability (as computed by our
model) than the average probability of success of the probit model. The portfolio
generates a compound annual return of 4.15% with a standard deviation of 4.50%,
with transaction costs of $0.04 per share traded. The portfolio also generates an
annual a of 97 basis points.
3.3.4 Expected Returns
The expected return E(R), on a particular investment is defined as:
(7rs x P) + (7rF x L) 365
E(R) = x - (3.6)
T T
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Figure 3-6: Variation between the conditional probabilities generated by our probit model
(7rpm) with that of the market-implied probabilities (7rm)
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0 0
where, 7rs is equal to the probability of success, P is the estimated profit, 7rF
1 - rs) is equal to the probability of failure, L is the estimated loss, I is the total
investment in a particular deal, and T is the estimated time to completion.
ER Portfolio
This portfolio is constructed using the probit model generated probabilities and
the computation of the expected return on each deal. In particular, we invest
in a deal if the expected return 4 is greater than two times that of the T-Bills
rate: E(R) > 2 * T-Bills. The portfolio also incorporates the RAIM constraints
for diversification purposes. The portfolio generated a compound annual return of
5.77% with a standard deviation of 5.18%, with transaction costs of $0.04 per share
traded. The portfolio also generates an annual a of 115 basis points.
3.3.5 Cross-Validation Portfolios
Cross-validation [15] is often used to estimate the ability of a statistical classifier.
Under cross-validation, the available data is divided into 2 disjoint sets; we then
estimate a probit model, based on the variables described in Section 3.3.3, on one
partition and test it on the other. The cross-validation estimate of a given perfor-
mance statistic is simply the mean of the statistic evaluated for each random test
partitions of the data. Cross-validation thus makes good use of the available data
as each pattern is used both as training and test data. Cross-validation is therefore
especially useful where the amount of available data is insufficient to form strong
conclusions about results.
4 We use the historical estimate of the expected time, as computed by our data set. T 90days.
The probabilities of success and failure are obtained from our probit model, described in Section
3.3.3.
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CV Portfolio
We use the cross-validation procedure on our data set, and using the merger char-
acteristic variables described in Section 3.3.3, we compute returns by investing in
all deals that have a probability of success greater than that of the average success
probability for the other set. The portfolio also incorporates the RAIM constraints
for diversification purposes. The portfolio generates a compound annual return of
5.76%, incorporating transaction costs of $0.04 per share traded, with a standard
deviation of 2.79%, compounded across all the simulations, and has a Sharpe Ratio
of 1.35. The portfolio also generates an annual a of 68 basis points.
3.4 Portfolios
We summarize the performance of all the portfolios, with and without trading costs,
in Figures 3-7 and 3-8. We can conclude that our probit prediction model is effective
and generates returns that are partly uncorrelated with the market. Also an arbi-
trageur could potentially use this model to create even more sophisticated trading
strategies, e.g. strategies based on the market-error . Further, our transaction cost
of $0.04 seem to be reasonable once we factor the various costs: brokerage commis-
sions, surcharges, and price impact. The approximate hit on earnings due to these
costs vary between 2% and 2.5%.
It must be noted that even the most conservative risk arbitrage fund managers
use a leverage of 2-3 times. Once we incorporate this leverage into our portfolio our
reported risk-adjusted returns are substantial even by industry standards.
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Figure 3-7: Portfolio returns for the different portfolios constructed in Section 3.3 without
trading costs.
51
Year VWRA RAIM PM ER
1998 12.64% 4.88% 7.48% 7.96%
1999 27.95% 11.29% 15.03% 18.41%
2000 7.69% 3.73% 4.98% 5.13%
2001 -20.62% -8.07% -1.01% -0.92%
2002 1.83% 3.25% 4.55% 6.72%
2003 5.43% 3.86% 6.03% 8.17%
2004 YTD 6.97% 3.84% 5.77% 7.58%
Compounded 5.48% 3.73% 6.51% 8.05%Returns 548
0.0081 0.0061 0.00101 0.0118
_ _(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
0.161 0.166 0.16 0.147
mkt (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289)
Std. Dev. 14.47% 5.72% 4.76% 5.73%
Sharpe Ratio 0.31 0.39 0.98 1.09
Figure 3-8: Portfolio returns for the different portfolios constructed in Section 3.3. All
portfolios have a direct trading cost of $0.04 per share traded.
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Year RAIM PM ER
1998 3.78% 5.36% 5.67%
1999 8.79% 12.10% 14.93%
2000 1.30% 3.05% 2.68%
2001 -9.12% -3.18% -2.31%
2002 0.45% 2.76% 4.57%
2003 2.73% 3.97% 6.89%
2004 YTD 2.18% 3.43% 5.76%
Compounded 1.42% 4.15% 5.77%Returns 1421
1 0.0057 0.0097 0.0115
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
J 0.163 0.158 0.142
mkt (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289)
Std. Dev. 5.39% 4.50% 5.18%
Sharpe Ratio 0.08 0.70 0.92
3.5 Possible Explanations for Risk Arbitrage Re-
turns
Most of the previous studies that attempt to assess the profitability of risk arbitrage
conclude that it generates substantial risk-adjusted returns. Excess returns are
greatest in those studies that focus on cash tender offers.
In this thesis, we use a long time series of risk arbitrage portfolio returns to at-
tempt to distinguish between market inefficiency and two alternative explanations
of returns to risk arbitrage investments. The first alternative explanation is that
transaction costs and other practical limitations prevent the average investor from
realizing the extraordinary gains documented in previous studies. Of the practical
limitations, one of the most important stems from the use of event time, rather
than calendar time, to calculate risk arbitrage returns. The event-time approach
involves calculating the rate of return obtained from investing after the merger an-
nouncement and selling after deal resolution. Returns from individual deals are first
"annualized" and then averaged across deals. The problem with this approach is
that it assumes that the risk arbitrage portfolio can earn event-time returns contin-
uously. Particularly for transactions that are consummated quickly, this assumption
can lead to large annualized returns.
The second possible explanation for the extraordinarily large documented re-
turns to risk arbitrage is that they represent compensation to investors for bearing
extraordinary amounts of systematic risk. Because most announced mergers are
successfully consummated, risk arbitrage investments usually generate small posi-
tive returns. Conditional on successful consummation, these returns depend on the
initial arbitrage spread and not on overall stock market returns. Therefore, returns
to risk arbitrage should contain very little systematic risk. However, risk arbitrage
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returns may be positively correlated with market returns during severe market down-
turns. This will be true if the probability of deal failure increases in depreciating
markets. Shleifer and Vishny [14] argue that although the hedge fund managers
who typically invest in merger situations may comprehend the risk/return profile
associated with risk arbitrage, their investors may not. Consequently, investors may
redeem their capital at precisely the wrong time, forcing risk arbitrage hedge fund
managers to "bail out of the market when their participation is most needed."
To distinguish between the market inefficiency story and the risk story, we esti-
mate the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM),
(Rriskarb - rf) = Ur + I3 mkt(Rmkt - rf) .
Here Rriskarb is the monthly return to a portfolio of risk arbitrage investments, rf
is the risk-free rate, and Rmkt is the return to the S&P 500 index. The intercept a
measures the average monthly abnormal return to the risk arbitrage portfolio, which
is zero under the null of market efficiency, given the model. If the estimated oe is
significantly positive, this suggests that the risk arbitrageur earns excess returns,
assuming that the model is correct.
As seen from our portfolio results, in Section 3.4, there is some evidence of
market efficiency, in that one can construct a strategy with positive risk-adjusted
returns even after adjusting for trading costs. We can also see that market implied
probabilities do seem to capture
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Chapter 4
Summary and Future Work
4.1 Summary
The central motif of this thesis is the quantification of the risk arbitrage investment
process. We compute different merger deal statistics and then through the intuition
obtained by those statistics we build a deal consummation prediction model to
formulate trading strategies. The model is based upon deal characteristics and
we construct and analyze portfolios based on our prediction model. Our portfolio
construction is concentrated on simple strategies and we obtain annual risk-adjusted
returns in excess of 4.5%. The described investment process and characterization of
the risk and return in risk arbitrage can be used as a stepping stone in building an
electronic trading platform.
4.2 Future Directions
This thesis represents one corner of a problem which not only requires a multifaceted
approach but has also traditionally been treated from a qualitative perspective. We
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briefly discuss some key open issues on which further study is necessary and provide
ideas on how they could be approached.
We mention a number of qualitative factors that are associated with the risk
arbitrage investment process (Section 3.2.3). Quantifying these factors in a mean-
ingful way is a difficult task. However one way of approaching the problem would
be by identifying the characteristics of deals which terminated due to one of the
specific risks (e.g. antitrust issues).
Given the dynamism of financial markets, the long term agenda of any electronic
trading program has to adhere to continuous review, calibration, and improvement.
On a more practical note, we suggest that a unifying theory of merger timing models
and the quantitative analysis presented in this thesis would form the cutting edge
of a risk arbitrage trading platform, and is much needed.
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Appendix A
Price Impact Model
Breen, Hodrick, and Korajczyk [3] estimate the price impact of a trade of specified
size based on liquidity characteristics of the underlying security. The price impact
equation is given as:
AP
= 3(NTO) (A.1)
PP
where price impact, -7,is equal to the percentage change in price resulting from a
trade with net turnover equal to NTO. Net turnover is defined as one-tenth of the
buyer initiated volume minus seller-initiated volume divided by shares outstanding.
Using the above equation, Breen et. al. estimate 3 from price changes and net
turnover over 5 minute and 30 minute intervals. 3s are then used in a cross-sectional
regression to obtain the following price impact model:
) = 8.77 + 2.52X 1 - 1.84X 2 - 1.39X 3 - 1.92X 4 - 27.5X5 - 8.29X 6 (A.2)
- 0.02X 7 - 0.38X8 + 0.63X 9 - 0.08Xio - 0.39X11
where,
X1 = log of market capitalization,
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X2 = log of previous quarter's trading volume,
X 3 = price at the end of the previous month divided by price 6 months prior,
X 4 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the equity is included in the S&P 500,
X 5 = dividend yield,
X6 = R 2 of returns v/s NYSE obtained from regressing monthly returns over the
prior 36 months,
X 7 = NYSE inclusion dummy,
X8 = NASDAQ inclusion dummy,
X = dummy variable equal to 1 if last earnings release was more than two months
ago,
X1o = percentage institutional ownership, X1 = dummy variable equal to 1 if there
are options traded on the security.
We use equation (A2) to estimate 3 for both the acquirer and the target. For any
arbitrary price impact level, we then use the estimate of 3 to calculate the maximum
allowable number of shares that can be traded, assuming this maximum does not
result in a position that exceeds 10% of the portfolio's total value. Equations (Al)
and (A2) are also used to compute the indirect cost of trading. For every transaction
in our index portfolio, we subtract transaction costs equal to the price impact implied
by equations (Al) and (A2), divided by 10. The factor of 10 is used to account for
the fact that traders attempt to limit the price impact of their trades by placing
many small orders to accumulate a large position.
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